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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Utah Criminal Code is to be construed to promote justice,
and to effect the objects of the law.

This Court has power to construe

"and" to mean "or11, in the Utah custodial interference statute, in
order to promote justice, and to clarify the application of the law.
In this case, this Court should construe the word "and",
between paragraphs (1) (a) and (1) (b) of Utah Code Annotated Section
76-5-303, to mean "or", in order to harmonize and reconcile the provisions of that statute.

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE "AND" TO MEAN
"OR11 IN THIS CASE.
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-2 provides that the statutes
of the State of Utah are to be liberally construed, with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes, and to promote justice.

This

principle is expressly made applicable to the Utah Criminal Code by
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-106, as follows:
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly
construed shall not apply to this code, any of
its provisions, or any offense defined by the
laws of this state. All provisions of this code
and offenses defined by the laws of this state
shall be construed according to the fair import
of their terms to promote justice and to effect
the objects of the law and general purposes of
Section 76-1-104.
The general rule is that courts have the power to change,
and will change,

ff

and" to "or", and vice-versa, whenever such conver-

sion is required by the context, or to save it from unconstitutionality,
or, in general, to effectuate the obvious intention of the legislature.
However, in penal statutes, the word "or" cannot be interpreted as
meaning "and", when the effect would be to aggravate the offense
or increase the punishment. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes, § 241, p. 420
(1974), citing Smith v. Casper, 419 P. 2d 704 (Wyo. 1966).
Numerous courts across the country have interpreted various
statutes in accordance with that general rule.

For example, in People

v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P. 2d 752 (Cal. 1985), the Supreme
Court of California held that the inadvertent use of the word "and",
where the purpose or intent of the statute seems clearly to require
the word "or", Digitized
is an
example of a drafting error which may properly
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be rectified by judicial construction.

Similarly, in McMechan v.

Everly Roofing,Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d
349, 656 P. 2d 797 (Kan. App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Kansas
held that the word "and" in a statute may be construed to mean "or",
when it is necessary to carry out the legislative intent.

For other

such examples of statutory construction by various courts, see, e.g.,
Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280,
493 A. 2d 341 (Mdkl985);

People v. Wang, 128 Misc. 2d 554, 490 N.Y.S.

2d 423 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); State vs. Hughes, 702 S.W. 2d 864 (Mo. App.
1985); and State v. Grimes, 292 S.C. 204, 355 S.E. 2d 538 (S.C. 1987).
Thus, it is clear that, where necessary to promote justice,
and to effect the objects of the law, this Court has the authority
to construe "and" to mean "or" in the Utah custodial interference
statute under consideration in this case.

POINT II: THIS COURT SHOULD CONSTRUE "AND" TO MEAN "OR" IN THIS
CASE, IN ORDER TO RECONCILE THE PROVISIONS OF THE CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE STATUTE.
In interpreting a statute, the Court should look to all
of its parts, and should not rely too heavily on characterizations
such as the "disjunctive" form versus the "conjunctive" form, in
resolving difficult issues.

Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.

2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986); cert.denied, 107 S. Ct. 1592-1593 (1987).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, in cases of apparent
conflict between provisions of the same statute, it is the Court's
duty to harmonize and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court
cannot presume that the legislature intended to create a conflict.
Where contradictory provisions are passed, the provision susceptible
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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-3-

of but one meaning will control those susceptible of two, if the
statute can thereby be rendered harmonious.

Madsen v. Brown, 701

P. 2d 1086 (Utah 1985) at 1089-90.
In this case, a careful examination of the current Utah
custodial interference statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5303, reveals that paragraph (1) (a) of that section must be interpreted
to operate independent of paragraphs (1) (b) and (2) of that section,
particularly in light of the 1979 and 1984 amendments to that section.
In 1979, the penalty for custodial interference was increased
from a Class B Misdemeanor in all cases to a Class A Misdemeanor;
and where, as in this case, the child is removed and taken from one
state to another, the penalty was increased to a third-degree felony.
In 1984, former subsection (3) was deleted, which dealt
with the taking of incompetents, or other persons "committed by authority
of law" to the custody of another person or institution, from such
other person or institution, knowing he or she has no legal right
to do so.
In the process of enhancing the penalty for violation of
Section 76-5-303 in 1979, and deleting the foregoing provision

in

1984, it is inconceivable that the legislature intended to deprive
natural parents of any remedy for unlawful interference with their
inherent parental rights to the custody of their own children, where
no court order of custody is in effect.

To read the statute as defendant

and respondent urges, in a manner restricting its application to
situations where custody has been ruled upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction, renders meaningless the phrase "whether a parent or
other" in paragraph (1).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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More importantly, the interpretation claimed by defendant
and respondent would create a conflict with paragraph (2) of the
statute, which the legislature surely did not intend.

If paragraph

(1) were to be restricted only to cases where there is an existing
judicial order of custody, then paragraph (2) would appear to be
inconsistent, because it does not require the element of "knowing
the actor has no legal right to do so."

It is readily apparent that

paragraph (1) (b) is intended to address those cases where a noncustodial parent holds a child for a period substantially longer
than the period prescribed by court order, while paragraph (2) is
intended to address the opposite situation of a custodial parent
who holds a child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful
visitation or custody rights.

Paragraph (2) does not require the

element of "knowing the actor has no legal right to do so";

yet

it addresses precisely the converse of the conduct prescribed by
paragraph (1) (b).

It would seem to be an artificial and convoluted

interpretation of this statute to require a culpable mental state
for a non-custodial parent, but not to require the same for a custodial
parent.
In short, the only reasonable interpretation of this statute,
which harmonizes and reconciles all of the foregoing provisions,
is to construe paragraph (1) (a) to operate independent of paragraphs
(1) (b) and (2).

By construing the statute in that manner, paragraph

(1) (a) would then protect the inherent custodial rights of natural
parents, where, as here, there is no existing judicial order of custody;
paragraph (1) (b) would address the situation where a non-custodial
parent holds a child inviolation of an existing court order;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and

paragraph (2) would address the circumstance where a custodial parent
holds a child in violation of lawful visitation or custody rights.
Such clarifying construction would neither aggravate the offense,
nor increase the punishment for the offense, and would clearly promote
justice in this case.

CONCLUSION
THE STATE OF UTAH respectfully requests that this Court
hold that the word "and" between paragraphs (1) (a) and (1) (b) of
Section 76-5-303 should be construed to mean "or", in order to harmonize
and reconcile the provisions of the statute, promote justice, and
effect the objects of the law;

and in order to give recourse to the

State of Utah in cases of unlawful interference with the inherent
parental rights of natural parents to the custody of their own children,
where there is no court order of custody in effect.

THE STATE OF

UTAH respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of
the Circuit Court, vacate the

Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered

by that Court, and remand this case to the Circuit Court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of July, 1988.

Patrick B. Nolan
Garfield
County Attorney
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